ABSTRACT: One of the most effective ways universities in war-
play deliberate and significant roles in promoting conflict-sensitive education, which broadly is the type of education aimed to understand, deconstruct, and transform deep-rooted structures of prejudice, suspicion, and hostilities in a society, as well as attitudes that tend to perceive a recourse to violence as legitimate and to maximize the possibilities for peace (European Students Union 2011; Brown 2012 ). This paper explores the contending models and strategies of conflict-sensitive higher education (notably the Bradford Model and the Centralized Unitary Model) in the context of post-conflict and volatile conflict-prone societies in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the problems and challenges associated with promoting peace education in the region. Based on an analytical reflection on the experiences of trying to rebuild many fractured societies educationally, this paper posits that in volatile regions and countries emerging from war, donor-interests need to go beyond funding the development and mainstreaming of new university programs in peace and conflict studies to include robustly investing in need assessment for local educational and training priorities, program assessment, staff training, and the empowerment of higher education regulatory bodies.
II. PEACE EDUCATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES
Peace education has been defined as a process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values needed to bring about behavior changes that will enable children, youth, and adults to prevent conflict and violence (both overt and structural), resolve conflict peacefully, and create the conditions conducive to peace at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national, international levels (Fountain 1999: 1; UNESCO 2002) . Training people about vari ous aspects of peace and the strategies for peacebuilding is one of the key ways of rebuilding, stabilizing, and transforming a society that has been through devastating conflict.
While modern peace education emerged in the West as a consequence of World War II and the correlated events of the Cold War, proactive peace education in sub-Saharan Africa began in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War and what was popu larly known as "the Af ri can crisis" (Arrighi 2002: 5) . The Af ri can crisis was a term coined in the 1980s for describing the series of convoluted developmental disasters that beset many Af ri can economies in the 1980s and 1990s, aggravated by the World Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP), and culminating in the breakdown of state authorities and armed conflicts. Prior to the end of the Cold War, a limited number of studies of Af ri can conflicts were undertaken by different policy think tanks (mostly development studies-oriented, e.g., CODESRIA), academic researchers within the vari ous mainstream social sciences and allied disciplines, as well as area studies research centers and departments in the West. Like in most other fields of study offered on the continent, the vast majority of the subject specialists that pioneered Af ri can peace and conflict research were Af ri cans and Af ri canists of expatriate origin who were mainly trained in the West. The fact that these pioneers were mainly trained in the West meant that they were imbued with nonAf ri can (West ern) conceptual tools, imaginations of reality, outlooks, and research methodologies, a phenomenon that has continued to vitiate the development of a regional pool of expertise and indigenous capacity for research (Brock-Utne 1998) . Significantly, this epistemological and methodological limitation is not exclusive to peace research; it is a challenge that cuts across the entire spectrum of higher education in Africa and partly linked to the (neo)colonial foundation and heritage of Af ri can educational systems.
There are a number of challenges to peace education in Af ri can higher education, such as the general suspicion associated with the Western origin and push for peace education (i.e., that peace education is subtly designed to foist West ern cultures and ideologies on Africa), inadequate and weak curriculum, paucity of requisite expertise, and weak capacity among available scholars. Other challenges include a shortage of research and teaching materials (relevant books, journals, libraries, etc.) and limited employment and career development opportunities for subject-area graduates and practitioners-a problem that is clearly linked to the weak absorptive capacities of Af ri can economies and the short-term nature of many donor-driven projects that create jobs in the peace and conflict industry (Francis 2008; Alimba 2013) .
For peace education to be effective, experts argue that it has to be comprehensively planned, embedded, and implemented both within and outside the different levels of the educational sector. Hence, while the formal educational sector comprising the primary, sec ondary, and tertiary levels are recognized as a key to vibrant peace education, many experts further recognize that in order to register the maximum impact in society, peace education should also integrate the informal and semiformal training sectors. The informal sectors would, for instance, com-prise the role of institutions like family, religious bodies, mass media, and community-based agencies as channels and networks of po liti cal socialization and, by deliberate design, education-for-peace. The semiformal sector would include the role of special short-term training and capacity-building programs such as workshops and seminars in generating, spreading, and strengthening a peace culture.
To a large extent, peace education in Africa seems to be focused on the formal education sector, especially at the level of tertiary education. At other levels of formal education, traditional citizenship or civic education tends to be more prevalent, although in many post-conflict societies, like Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Liberia, and Uganda, citizenship education (sometimes structured as part of Social Studies) at primary and post-primary levels have significant lessons in non-violent methods of dispute settlement and peacebuilding (LUGUSI Network Newsletter 2012; West Africa Network for Peacebuilding 2012).
Given the proliferation of structures of conflict in Africa (both structural and active violence), the limitations of peace education must be clearly underscored. It will be practically misleading and futile to hinge the solution to Af ri can conflicts on peace education, which seems to be one of the common mistakes made by some experts and practitioners. As important as it is, well-structured and effectively delivered comprehensive peace education cannot be a substitute for po liti cal and economic reforms, democratization and good governance. Many independent and authoritative research studies have demonstrated that effective po liti cal, constitutional, and economic reforms-in clud ing the skills and motivation to take advantage of the benefits of reforms-are some of the indispensable conditions to sustainable peace, stability, and development on the continent (Moyo 2009; Ascher and Mirovitskaya 2013) .
III. STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO PEACE AND CONFLICT-SENSITIVE EDUCATION
One of the strongest impediments to peace in many Af ri can countries, especially in volatile conflict-prone states and countries emerging from armed conflicts, is the legacy of violence, which actively feeds a deep-rooted perception among antagonistic communities and large sections of the population that violence is a legitimate instrument for conducting pub lic affairs and the pursuit of goals. Social psychologists have shown that when people are exposed to a prolonged culture of violence and armed conflict, they are left with a twisted worldview that tends to perceive the use of violence, aggressive behavior, and the resort to disorder as a normal way of life (Kelman 2010) . Many studies have shown how virulent patterns of neopatrimonial politics have at different conjunctures produced or reinforced the culture of po liti cal violence in the Af ri can fragile, weak, failed, and collapsed states (Rotberg 2004; Bach 2011; Ewusi 2014) . Abu Bakarr Bah (2011) has specifically used the example of Sierra Leone to show how the processes of state decay, marked by the systematic deterioration of the state's capacity to deliver positive po liti cal goods, could precipitate a descent to war and feed a culture of violence. "State decay in Sierra Leone," according to Bah (2011: 200) , "was manifested in economic decline, corruption, dilapidation of state institutions and infrastructure, and breakdown of the rule of law." The consequences of perpetuating a culture of violence in society are more blatant for children and people who have lived all the cognitive stages of their lives under conditions of embedded hostilities, abuse, and armed violence.
An analy sis of the embedded culture of violence in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa certainly makes greater sense against the backdrop of Africa's population dynamics. In terms of a geo-demographic base factor, Africa's population has witnessed a rapid increase since the 1970s. Africa's population has grown from about 221 million in 1950 to 408 million in 1975, 796 million in 2000, and 1.1 billion in 2013 (UNFPA 2010; World Bank n.d.). Among the many factors that have contributed to Africa's population growth rate (e.g., decreasing infant and maternal mortality, gains made in combating infectious diseases and HIV, etc.), the most significant is the fact that there is a large num ber of women who, under circumstances of rapid cultural, sociodemographic, and economic change, have no access to and opportunities for family planning (UNFPA 2010; Zinkina and Korotayev 2014) . Under conditions of extreme poverty and prolonged conflict, as is the case in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, a high population growth rate has been tempered with low life expectancy at birth (the average in sub-Saharan Africa being about fifty-five years in 2012) and a worrying youth bulge, as there is a large percentage of unemployed young people in the population (BBC 2009; World Bank n.d.) . In most countries of sub-Saharan Africa, at least 50% of the population is below the age of twenty-five, and a further 43% of the population is below the age of fifteen (UNFPA 2010; Population Reference Bureau 2013).
The implication of the rapid demographic change in sub-Saharan Africa for the embedded culture of violence profile is that in most volatile conflict-prone and war-affected countries and regions, such as South Sudan, Darfur (west ern Sudan), north ern Uganda, East ern DRC, Central Af ri can Repub lic (CAR), Chad, Nigeria, and, to a lesser extent, post-war Sierra Leone and Liberia, well over half of the population in these countries or sub-national regions have more or less lived their entire lives under a highly dysfunctional culture of violence. The rebel war waged by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in north ern Uganda lasted for twenty years . The liberation war in South Sudan lasted for nearly forty years (1955-1972 and 1983-2005) , and the country has once more relapsed to armed conflict since De cember 2013. The civil war in Darfur has been fought since 2003 and the civil war in Liberia lasted for fourteen years (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . In addition, the war in East ern DRC has gone on since 1996. The po liti cal histories of Chad and CAR have been characterized by violent military coups and repeated relapses to armed conflict since independence. Similarly, since the end of the Biafra civil war in 1970, Nigeria's history has been marred by repeated military coups, prolonged dictatorship, as well as endemic structures of communal violence and militia insurgencies in different sub-national regions leading to a prolonged state of "no war, no peace" in the country (Obi 2009: 132) .
A major aggravating structural factor is the proliferation of microcommunal conflicts within and between states, most of which have a protracted history that dates back to precolonial times. A large number of the micro-communal conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa are linked to ambiguities surrounding the issue of land tenure in many states (notably issues about who has the right to own, use, and expropriate lands); the age-old tradition of cattle raiding and blood feuding between the youth of vari ous affected tribes and communities (notably in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa). The cattle-raiding tradition is, among other things, sometimes linked to the customary requirement of a large number of cattle from a potential bridegroom as payment for bride price in traditional marriage ceremonies among some local communities (Omeje and Hepner 2013) . The fact that many feuding ethnic communities straddle between national borders occasionally leads to cross-border mobilization of ethnic combatants and retreating and arming of fighting forces. Other micro-communal conflict factors include the high incidence of cattle rustling and destruction of farm crops associated with pastoralists' herding of their livestock into sedentary farming communities, as well as the rapid proliferation of small arms and light weapons among hostile communities. It suffices to say that when violence becomes entrenched as a means of conducting and settling po liti cal affairs, it inadvertently rubs off on the dominant culture of politics, leaving behind a convoluted culture in which the resort to armed conflict becomes an acceptable framework for po liti cal action and behavior (Jackson and Jackson 1997) .
Both within and in the aftermath of the conflict life span, the observed embedded culture of violence is what largely shapes the mentality, attitudes, temperament, behavioral patterns, and idiosyncrasies of large sections of the population. It is further solidified and perpetuated by (in)formal processes of po liti cal socialization, such as the family, religious and cultural institutions, mass media, po liti cal parties, etc. The practical challenge of peace education in these circumstances is how to, most importantly, deconstruct the endemic culture of violence and in its place construct and embed a culture of peace. It is apparent that peace education planners in most of these countries do not appreciate the deep-rootedness of a virulent violent culture among their populace and communities, a foundational knowledge considered prerequisitial for designing a comprehensive strategy for cultural transformation through education-for-peace.
IV. THE "BRADFORD MODEL" OF PEACE AND CONFLICT-SENSITIVE EDUCATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
It will suffice to use this section to reflect on what I have, for analytical convenience, called the "Bradford Model of Peace Education." 1 I will define the model as a substantially consultative, flexible, integrative, participatory, context-specific, and stakeholder-centered model of curriculum planning and implementation in peace education at tertiary school levels. The model has been developed from a raft of externally funded education-for-peace projects I have taken part in developing and implementing since 2004 at both the Africa Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (later renamed the John and Elnora Ferguson Centre for Af ri can Studies) at the University of Bradford in the UK and the United States International University in Nairobi, Kenya. A few of the projects had already been initiated before I joined the center at Bradford University. The core of these peace education-related projects has taken place in war-affected and volatile conflict-prone countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, DRC, Nigeria, and Kenya. The projects have been vari ously funded by the DFID/British Council, the West Minster Foundation for Democracy, and the Allan and Nesta Ferguson Trust. I have also been part of similar practical peacebuilding capacity-building projects (as opposed to university-based peace education-related projects) in Nigeria, Burundi, South Sudan, and Rwanda. Based on my involvement in vari ous peace education capacity-building program development and implementation, the Bradford model of peace education can be summarized as distinguished by certain systematic operational and practical rubrics outlined in the table above.
The intellectual and epistemological foundation of the model is the principle that peace is knowable (literally "discernible" by subject experts through research), teachable (through knowledge, values, and skills impartation), and learnable (internalization of what is imparted), which can ultimately change the attitudes and behaviors of people in a desired non-violent direction and impact the entire social structure, cultural norms, and institutions of society. Having been through years of turbulent conflict, many paradigm proponents and sympathizers argue war-affected and volatile conflict-prone countries such as those of sub-Saharan Africa ostensibly have the greatest need for peace and 2 Developing new study and training programs in peace educationrelated fields through curriculum development and review workshops.
3 Strengthening existing course provisions in cognate disciplines such as Political Science, Sociology, and History/African Studies for the teaching of peace education-centered topics.
4 Training of trainers' workshops.
5 Provision of resource materials, mostly relevant textbooks.
6 Short-term staff development visits between the University of Bradford and the African partner institutions, as well as exchange visits between African partner universities.
7 Capacity-building in research/publication and promoting of collaborative research and publications among lecturers in participating universities.
human rights education (Francis 2009; Alimba 2013) . These philosophical principles are more or less at the heart of modern peace education, and it is a position that many structuralist and post-structuralist intellectuals have problems with-a debate I do not intend to pursue in this paper. Below is a discussion of some of the elements of the Bradford Model as implemented in the case countries. 2 In post-war Sierra Leone, the Bradford Model of capacity-building project we executed aimed to promote peace education in universities and peace education, human rights, democratic governance, and community policing in the security sector (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . In post-war Liberia, on the other hand, we worked on a project aimed to reinvent higher education for conflict transformation and peacebuilding (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . The rationale was that in the post-war dispensation, Sierra Leonean and Liberian universities and security forces (mostly the police) should be enabled to play functional roles in "building the peace by initiating or participating in vari ous national and community-based peacebuilding projects, e.g., security sector reforms (SSR), disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of rebels, child soldiers and ex-combatants; confidence-building measures between the civilian populations and security forces, etc." (University of Bradford 2005: 4-6, 2007a: 4-5). Hence, besides universities, the police forces were specifically targeted for these capacity-building projects because of their record of systematic violations of human rights, their apparent lack of knowledge of basic human rights principles, the history of their involvement in antidemocratic activities, and their destructive roles in civil wars and violent conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia (University of Bradford 2005 Bradford : 4-5, 2007a .
Using the Bradford Model of peace education, we sought to achieve the capacity-building project goals in the two West Af ri can countries between 2003 and 2008 by undertaking the following activities:
1. Convening a number of curriculum development and review workshops (CDRWs) to develop new programs of study in two Liberian universities-University of Liberia in Monrovia and Cuttington University in Gbanga (Diploma and BA degree programs in Peace and Conflict Resolution) and three Sierra Leonean universities-Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone (Diploma and BA degree courses in Peace and Conflict Studies), Njala University College (Diploma and MA degrees in Peace and Development Studies), and Milton Maggai College of Education & Technology (Diploma and BA degrees in Peace Education). The CDRWs emphasized in their pedagogical contents an integrative blend of the global/ international and the local/ regional realities, as well as the "theory-praxis" nexus. 2. Strengthening existing course provisions in cognate disciplines (like Po liti cal Science, Sociology, History/Af ri can Studies, Psychology, and Law) to teach practical modules and topics in peace, conflict, security, and conflict resolution. We had to develop a number of stand-alone undergraduate and MA degree courses in peace and conflict studies, which we mainstreamed in the existing curricula in the cognate disciplines. Some of the course modules we developed had such titles as: "The Sociology of Peace & Conflict in International Relations," "The Af ri can Practices and Mechanisms of Conflict Management," "Methods of Conflict Analysis," "Peace and Security Issues in Africa," "Leadership and the Culture of Peace," "Conflict Prevention, Peacekeeping, and Peace Consolidation," "Humanitarian Interventions and Conflicts in Africa," and "Conflict Resolution and Development: Applied Skills." 3. Involvement of the West Yorkshire Police in England in the development/review of community policing strategies in the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) and Liberian National Police (LNP). In addition, we facilitated the establishment of a staff development visit of selected SLP and LNP officers to the Bishopgarth West Yorkshire Police Training and Development Centre in Wakefield. The focus of the training programs in Wakefield and similar capacity-building workshops we organized in Freetown and Monrovia was mainly on strengthening "community policing" and "police-pub lic relations." 4. Training of Trainers' Workshops. We organized specialized training workshops on the core values and pedagogy of educationfor-peace for lecturers in the Social Sciences, Law, and other related disciplines crucial to peace education. In Liberia, instructors and senior officers of the LNP were invited to these workshops while in Sierra Leone we organized a series of parallel work shops for instructors in the SLP training school. 5. Provision of resource materials, mostly relevant textbooks to support teaching, research, and learning to the beneficiary institutions and police academies. To each of the participating universities and police academies, we bought and supplied between forty and sixty relevant textbooks. For each, we gener-ated a list of books from the local project coordinators in the institutions and used the resources of Bradford University to mutually amend the lists and provide more up-to-date books than they had requested. 6. Short-term staff development visits between the University of Bradford and the Sierra Leonean and Liberian partner institutions to promote curriculum participation and learning. Two persons from each Af ri can partner institution were usually invited to Bradford for staff development capacity-building opportunities for periods of less than two weeks in each project year to help them acquire first-hand exposure to the Bradford University program, consult with relevant experts, audit lectures of interest to them, use library resources and photocopy relevant materials, and also to present pub lic seminars and lectures to students on the war-to-peace transition and educational conditions in their country. 7. Promoting collaborative research and publications among lecturers in participating universities. A number of universitylevel readers were published through these vari ous projects, the most notable perhaps being War to Peace Transition: Conflict Intervention and Peacebuilding in Liberia (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2009). Newsletters and periodicals were also published to document and disseminate the achievements, best practices, and challenges of the projects (University of Bradford, 2004 Bradford, , 2007b Bradford, , 2008 .
Elsewhere in Uganda and Nigeria, the Africa Centre executed some more or less similar projects in partnership with different local universities and other stakeholders. In Uganda, for instance, we developed a triangular partnership for capacity-building in peace education involving the University of Bradford (Africa Centre), two Ugandan-based universities ( In the DRC, our emphasis was on strengthening the capacity of universities for peacebuilding and conflict transformation, notably the University of Kinshasa (2006 Kinshasa ( -2008 and University of Lubumbashi (2006 Lubumbashi ( -2012 , where we implemented two related projects. In a particular three-year peace education-related capacity-building project for the Great Lakes region involving three partner universities based in Kenya, North ern Uganda, and DRC, and working in partnership with the University of Bradford (2009-2012), we focused on two key practical objectives: a) develop the institutional and collaborative capacities of the partner universities to play applied functional roles in conflict and development intervention and b) expand and strengthen the employability skills and opportunities of undergraduate and graduate students in some cognate fields of study (LUGUSI Network Newsletters 2010 , 2011 .
Funded by the British Council England-Africa Partnership EAP/ DelPHE grant schemes, the above projects we implemented in Kenya, North ern Uganda, and DRC were developed against the following backdrop: a) multifaceted and interlocking conflicts and wars that have blighted the Af ri can Great Lakes region for over the past two decades, b) poor capacity for practical conflict and development intervention in existing higher education curricula, and c) the traditional inclination of higher education partnerships in Africa toward vertical cooperation with West ern institutions with the result that collaboration within the region is highly limited (LUGUSI Network Newsletters 2010 , 2011 Omeje and Hepner 2013: 1-2) .
To help address some of the capacity needs identified by the collaborating Af ri can universities, vari ous project activities were devel-oped and implemented in Kenya, North ern Uganda, and DRC between 2006 and 2012 in accordance with the evolving Bradford Model. These include:
1. Review and strengthening of the Peace, Conflict, and Development Studies curricula of the three partner universities using the operational frameworks of twelve different collaborative and in di vidual university-based workshops. Some new practical modules and training programs (e.g., student work placement/ internships, study visits to relevant organizations, and community service schemes) were developed or strengthened at the undergraduate and graduate levels. One of the major innovations we introduced in this curriculum review was the involvement of university students and representatives of relevant employment sectors (international organizations, government agencies, and civil society) in the workshops, an initiative that added an immense enriching value to the program. 2. University faculty (teaching staff) exchanged visits between partner institutions to promote curriculum participation in teaching and regional cooperation in research, students counseling/ thesis supervision, seminars, and publication. Un der this collaborative initiative, lecturers were cross-posted between different partner universities over a limited period of one to two weeks in each one year-project cycle. 3. Research and publication opportunities and skill acquisition program for project partners, leading to the production of a relevant edited book project useable in research/teaching in the area of Peace, Conflict, and Development Studies in the Afri can Great Lakes Region (AGLR) and beyond-Conflict and Peacebuilding in the Af ri can Great Lakes Region (Indiana University Press, 2013). 4. Provision of a limited number of relevant textbooks (forty to fifty books) in Peace, Conflict, and Development Studies for the comparatively underresourced partner institutions (University of Lubumbashi and Gulu University). 5. Career counseling services for students using both internal and external professional counselors. At Gulu University, career counseling was complemented by community outreach programs to, among other things, inspire war-affected school children and provide practical training in post-conflict counseling/ victim rehabilitation for MA students of Development Studies and Conflict Transformation. 6. Production of an annual project newsletter for dissemination of information about project activities, challenges, and opportunities for higher education partnerships in the region. The annual newsletters were distributed in both hardcopy and electronic formats (using email and the project website) (LUGUSI Network Newsletter 2010 , 2011 .
Broadly, in the way it has progressively evolved, the Bradford Model is a substantially flexible, decentralized, integrative, and participatory model of curriculum planning and implementation in peace education. There was some measure of consultation with local stakeholders before any of the programs were developed or sometimes in the process of developing them. Consultations took the form of electronic communication with identified stakeholders (mainly emails and telephones) and fact-finding visits. It suffices to say that this model is not entirely fool-proof because its strengths and weaknesses have become more apparent to me over the years that I have been a key practitioner. Many curriculum developers and practitioners introducing peace education in Africa and perhaps elsewhere tend to wittingly or unwittingly operationalize Bradford Model project activities either in isolation or combination. Is there a discernible alternative or parallel to the Bradford Model of peace education in Af ri can higher education?
An alternative to the Bradford Model would be the centralized unitary approach to curriculum planning in peace education, which tends to be prevalent in many Af ri can universities, especially (but not exclusively) in francophone countries like the DRC, Congo, and Rwanda. Under this paradigm, a uniform curriculum is centrally developed, often times by a relevant government agency, and introduced across the entire spectrum of university education within the jurisdiction of the authorities. In some versions, the task of developing a new curriculum could be outsourced to expert consultants or be undertaken by a college of technical experts, who develop all aspects of the curriculum, includ ing goals, content, learning experiences/outcomes, and evaluation strategies. A number of British, German, and Belgian universities engaged in the enterprise of introducing peace education in war-affected and volatile conflict-prone Af ri can countries have adopted this centralized model by which they of ten interpose a draft curriculum they have developed abroad to the beneficiary universities for adoption mutatis mutandis. Centralized curriculum planning is most prevalent in lower levels of education (primary and post-primary) in different parts of the world where curriculum is seen as a vehicle for transmitting national ideology and fostering or preserving a cherished national culture (Makaye et al. 2013: 42) . Under a centralized curriculum model, the classroom instructor, teacher, or lecturer is tasked with mainly implementing the curriculum, albeit in practice, there is room for interpretation and delivery is not completely taken away from the implementer, particularly at the university level. The centralized model of peace education curriculum planning has its recognized strengths and weaknesses (Makaye et al. 2013 ).
V. CONCLUSION: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON CONTEMPORARY PEACE EDUCATION IN AFRICA AND THE WAY FORWARD
For methodological and analytical convenience, I have limited this empirical reflection on peace and conflict-sensitive education in subSaharan Africa to the practical projects in which I have directly taken part since Janu ary 2004. Over the period I have been involved in the Bradford Model at the university's Africa Centre or been associated with its "brand," the center has implemented a considerable number of peace education projects in countries like Ethiopia, DRC, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, of which I was not able to be a part. The center has also provided advisory services and related technical support to different international institutions, research/policy think tanks on peace, and conflict intervention programs in Africa.
Assessing what we have done over the years in promoting the Bradford Model is somewhat problematic, as I could be easily charged with having a conflict of interest because I have been a longstanding actor and participant. However, from the standpoint of constructivist epistemology, social knowledge is not detached or disconnected from the epistemic worldview and actions of a researcher or practitioner (Breuer and Roth 2003: 1) . I am therefore more methodologically inclined to the post-structuralist paradigm of personal reflexivity in research, which espouses an awareness of the researcher's contribution to the construction of "meanings" through out the research process; progressively reflecting on and striving to manage the ways in which one's own values, experiences, interests, beliefs, po liti cal commitments, wider aims in life, and social identity compete to shape the research and knowledge production processes (Willig 2001: 10) . Furthermore, it is eminently timely that one reflects on the approach, strategies, and limitations of peace education in sub-Saharan Africa because I am not aware of any scholarly work that have seriously reflected on the practical works we and other stakeholders have done over the years.
One of the greatest challenges in the enterprise of peace education in Africa is that there has not been any rigorous external audit or evaluation of the large number of donor-driven programs that have emerged in many Af ri can higher education institutions since the 1990s. None of the donor-driven projects of which I have been a part has ever been subjected to a comprehensive independent external evaluation with a view to determining its content relevance and appropriateness, sensitivity to local conflicts, and related factors; local delivery capacity and strategies; quality assurance; sustainability plan; impact on the domestic environment; and so forth. For administrative convenience perhaps most donors rely on the evaluation programs proposed by the grant recipients, which in most cases are based on their internal evaluation of specific activities, such as capacity building-workshops. Grant recipients have great maneuverability in the way they report these selfevaluations and therefore will of ten present a supportive report to the donors. Consequently, most local workshop and project participants feel a sense of honor and privilege to be part of something that usually provides them with additional income (in terms of per diem, stipends, and travel allowances) and therefore will in most cases give a glowing evaluation. The result is that, in the end, one does not really have a true picture of the desirability, operationality, and impact of these supposedly well-meaning donor-driven peace education projects, in clud ing the Bradford Model. More or less, one could possibly make a similar remark about most other non-donor driven educational programs in subSaharan Africa. Reliable and independent evaluation of higher education programs of study is crucially important for progress assessment and development planning in the region.
The sec ond challenge, which is related to the foregoing observation, has to do with the empirical relevance of many peace education curricula that have been developed and are being implemented in Africa. Having facilitated dozens of educational and development workshops in sub-Saharan Africa, I have always felt a personal frustration in challenging and inspiring participants (mostly Af ri can academics trained in West ern social science epistemologies) to think creatively in ways that could give us an authentic Af ri can peace education curriculum. Francis (2009: 1) has made a similar observation about this dilemma: "Most of the university programs and dominant philosophy and educational systems have been patterned on the North ern universities; so they do not reflect the actual needs and aspirations of Af ri can communities, Af ri can societies, especially in countries emerging from wars and armed conflict. So relevance and appropriateness are some of the criti cal challenges facing universities and the higher education sector across Africa."
The third and perhaps most compelling challenge to promoting peace education on the continent is the parlous state of the higher education sector in most war-affected and volatile conflict-prone areas of sub-Saharan Africa, which include the following: extreme funding shortages, poor remuneration of lecturers and university staff, braindrain, heavy reliance on donor funding and technical support, frequent and prolonged strikes by lecturers (of ten associated with abysmal conditions of service), extremely weak, inadequate, and collapsed infrastructures (classrooms, offices, student hostels, libraries, electricity, health clinics, water, ICT, etc.), large lecturer/student ratios (of ten in excess of 1 lecturer per 300 students), a preponderance of locally trained, poorly skilled, and demotivated instructors, and, perhaps most dismal, an extreme paucity of current literature. In fact, in Liberia, Sierra Leone, North ern Uganda, and South Sudan we repeatedly came across many bullet-riddled and partially collapsed university classrooms, in clud ing a number of temporarily displaced departments and faculties located in war-torn and derelict pub lic or private properties. In the absence of a strong private sector, the state remains the chief provider of higher education in these countries, but given the weak economic base of most of them (especially Burundi, South Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, and, to a lesser extent, Uganda and Rwanda), the government is, for the most part, in an extremely weak position to fund, regulate, and meet the growing demands for higher education (LUGUSI Network Newsletters 2010 , 2011 Ewusi 2014) . In terms of capacity, the states' higher education regulatory bodies are equally as weak. They are poorly resourced, shambolic, and, in most cases, as dysfunctional as the universities themselves. It is against this backdrop that one needs to understand the predicament of peace education in volatile and war-affected countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
The fourth and final challenge to promoting peace education in Africa is bureaucratic bottlenecks, undue delay in policy mainstream-ing, and institutional buy-in at both the university and government higher education management levels, without which new programs of study may not be officially accredited, recognized, or implemented. This problem, however, varies from one country to another. From my experience, internal approval of new programs by the university senate was a lot quicker and more straightforward in Sierra Leone and Liberia than Uganda and Kenya. External accreditation by the government regulatory body is problematic in virtually all the countries and could literally go on forever, but the interesting thing is that most universities have the flexibility to introduce a new program of study once it has been internally approved by university authorities. The most frustrating example we came across under the Bradford Model was in DRC, where an inflexibly centralized curriculum management sys tem exists, which means that no university is allowed to introduce a new program or subject on its own without approval from the ministry of higher education. Furthermore, any new course or program of study must be more or less uniformly introduced in all the universities. We not only found this to be frustrating, but also rather contrary to the philosophy of peace education, a field of study that should be more sensitive to local contexts and needs.
Moving forward, the remedy for some of the identified key challenges could be easily inferred. There is the need for independent and periodic evaluation of existing programs of study in sub-Saharan Africa, especially the new donor-driven peace education programs in order to make them more context-relevant and conflict-sensitive. In countries emerging from war, donor interests need to go beyond funding the development and mainstreaming of new university programs in peace and conflict studies to include robustly investing in need assessment for local educational and training priorities, program assessment, staff training, and empowering higher education regulatory bodies, among others. Furthermore, research has shown that one of the major reasons why many poor developing countries emerging from war have a high risk of relapsing to armed conflict is because of the large number of unskilled and poorly skilled unemployed young people there (Collier 2008; Brown 2012) . It is therefore imperative that peace education-related programs of study, as well as all other university and non-university based training programs, be practically linked to entrepreneurship education and employability opportunities. Similarly, all other university-and non-university-level educational training programs should have key aspects of peace education mainstreamed into their curricula. To be comprehensive and effective, peace education curricula in most war-affected and volatile conflict-prone countries in sub-Saharan Africa, among other things, should also aim to redress the embedded culture of violence in their respective countries, as discussed in this paper.
NOTES
1. For want of an appropriate terminology, I have called the paradigm discussed in this section "the Bradford Model," a tribute to one of the world's largest and most famous centers of excellence in modern peace education. There is the need to caution that what I have described as the Bradford Model did not necessarily or entirely originate at the university. I have attributed it cautiously to the university to underscore the influential and passionate contribution it has made in enriching and operationalizing the model over the years (especially in the past decade), not least in sub-Saharan Africa. 2. Many proponents of neorealism, frustration-aggression theory, postMarxist theories of the state, criti cal security studies, and postmodernism, among other structuralist and post-structuralist perspectives, are of the view that violence is endemically embedded in the structures of society and/or human nature. As such, some are, at best, skeptical of the relevance and efficacy of peace education (cf. Bandura 1973; Giddens 1991; Spruyt et al. 2014 ).
